




A legal system, whose myths base it on rules stemming from
specific authoritative sources distinct from the agencies applying
them, is presented with the logical possibility of a gap or lacuna
within that body of rules. It appears that only one municipal
system-classical Roman law-permitted a judge in such a situation
to abstain from granting a judgment, by delivering a holding of
non-liquet.1 Other legal systems, either expressly or impliedly, have
arranged an ad hoc substitute jurisprudence for cases in which the law
is either non-existent or unclear. 2 The common-law tradition, for
example, has accommodated the extremes of both Blackstone and
the institution of "judge-made" law. The Swiss Civil Code orders the
judge in situations of rule-gaps to act as if he were legislator.3 The
French legislator showed his impatience with the non-liquet theory by
providing in Article 4 of the French Civil Code that a judge who
refused to pronounce judgment ". . . under pretext of the silence,
obscurity or insufficiency of the law ... " would be prosecuted for a
denial of justice.4
* Of the Connecticut Bar; Research Associate, Yale Law School, New Haven, Conn.
1 For a classical discussion, see HUNTER, ROMAN LAW 59 (1903); SIORAT, LE
PROBLiME DES LACUNES EN DROIT INTERNATIONAL (Paris, 1958); STONE, LEGAL REGULA-
TION OF INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT 153 (1954). Wholly aside from the fact of inevitable
marginal prescriptive creativity in judicial application, there is some question as to whether non
liquet was even more than theoretical formula in Roman law. The praetorial function, for
example, merged legislative and judicial functions. For a recent, comprehensive symposium on
lacunae and non-liquet, see PERELMAN (ed.) ETUDES DE LOGIQUE JURIDIQUE, Vol. 1 (1966) Vol.
2 (1967).
2 For a comprehensive collection of national legislative directives for lacunae, see BIN
CHENG, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW AS APPLIED BY INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS 400-409
(1953).
3 "A ddfaut d'une disposition 1dgale applicable, le juge prononce selon le droit
coutumier et a ddfaut d'une coutume selon les regles qu'il etablirait s'il avait a faire acte de
1dgislateur."
4 "Le juge qui refusera de juger sous pretexte du silence, de l'obscurit6 ou de
l'insuffisance de la loi, pourra etre poursuivi comme coupable de ddni de justice."
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The majority of international doctrinal writers have taken a
position against the possibility of a non-liquet judgment in interna-
tional law despite the attendant inconsistency with their general
jurisprudential views. Rule 40 of the Fiore Plan expressly forbids
such a judgment. 5 Article 32 of the Projet Corsi was to the same
effect. 6 Article 19 of the draft of the Institut de Droit International
also rejected non-liquet.7 Asser, deLapradelle and Politis,8 all empha-
sizing the contractual nature of arbitration, allowed for a non-liquet
judgment. These latter writers, it may be noted, were emphasizing the
rules laid down in the compromis and were not specifically addressing
themselves to a gap theory of international law.
Siorat, in contrast, in his rigorous study of the lacuna in
international law, takes a broader positivistic position, compares the
lacuna to a variety of other application problems facing judges and
emphatically affirms the possibility of a legitimate non-liquet judg-
ment.9 Among those who tend to reject the legitimacy of a non-liquet
response, Wittenberg argued for an implicit authority in the com-
promis to render a judgment: he maintained that submission of a
question to arbitration implies bilateral agreement that there is an
answer. 10 Lauterpacht also rejects the non-liquet judgment, but the
logic of his argument is not compelling." In an early presentation,
Professor Stone offered a detailed analysis of the problem but
reached no conclusion, convinced that the question remained the-
oretical so long as there is no compulsory international jurisdiction.
In two subsequent publications, he has edged away from this position
5 DARBY, INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS 338 (1897).
6 Id. at 314.
7 Id. at 278.
8 Note Doctrinale to the Alabama Claims in 1 LAPRADELLE-POLITIS, RECUEIL DES
ARBITRAGES INTERNATIONAUX 398; 2 id. at 913.
9 SIORAT, supra n. 1. A detailed review and appraisal of Siorat and of Lauterpacht is
found in Stone, Non Liquet and the Function of Law in the International Community, 35
B.Y.B.I.L. 124 (1959).
1o WITTENBERG, L'ORGANISATION JUDICIARE, LA PROCFDURE ET LA SENTENCE INTER-
NATIONALE 314-315 (1937).
11 LAUTERPACHT, THE FUNCTION OF LAW IN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY
127-138 (1933); id. Non-Liquet and the Completeness of Law, SYMBOLAE VERZISL 196 (1958).
A number of writers have sought to assimilate non-liquet to the general equity power of a
tribunal. While equity is certainly a prescriptive extension, its operation is rather severely
limited in regard to the International Court by Article 58 (2): "This provision shall not prejudice
the power of the Court to decide a case ex aequo et bono, if the parties agree thereto." For a
restrictive discussion of the import of this provision, see Scheaner, Decisions ex aequo et bono
by International Courts and Arbitral Tribunals in SANDERS (ed.), INTERNATIONAL ARBITRA-
TION: LIBER AMICORUM FOR MARTIN DOMKE 275 (1967).
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and now seems to believe that certain prescriptive challenges may
face an international judge, for which the best response would be a
holding of non-liquet.12
Simpson and Fox,13 approaching the problem from the perspec-
tive of an arbitrator called upon to respond to a claim of non-liquet,
attempt to compromise the positions of deLapradelle and Wittenberg.
While Simpson and Fox accept the possibility of a non-liquet, they
contend that certain compromissory formulations exclude, by impli-
cation, the possibility of such a conclusion. Since one of these
formulations is "general principles of law," non-liquet can only arise
when a compromis provides for one of two exclusive answers. Yet,
even here, they cite with approval Huber's award in Island of
Palmas,'4 in which he was faced with such an exclusive disjunction,
yet held that the compromis ruled out, by implication, a possible
non-liquet decision.
The claim of non-liquet has arisen in a variety of cases. In the
Portugese Colonies case between Portugal and Germany the arbitra-
tors noted the absence of relevant international rules, but held that
... they must fill the gap by deciding according to the "principle of equity," in
the sense of "international law" applied by analogy; and taking account of its
evolution.' 5
In the Island of Palmas case, Judge Huber precluded the possibility
of a non-liquet by reference to the implied intentions of the parties.
But the compromis of the Bulawa Island case' 6 and the Delagoa Bay
case' 7 permitted the arbitrator to refuse to decide, despite the fact
that he was accorded a contingent power to decide equitably if
neither of the respective claims could be established.
In a number of cases, an international judge refused to render a
decision on the grounds of non-liquet. In the Lizzie Thompson case,
between the United States and Peru, the King of Belgium was named
as "arbitrator, umpire and friendly arbitrator." He declined to act on
the ground that the arbitration would be "of a very delicate nature by
12 STONE, LEGAL REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT 153 (1954); id. Non-
Liquet and the Function of Law in the International Community, 35 B.Y.B.I.L. 124 (1959); id.,
Non-Liquet and the International Judicial Function in PERELMAN (ed.), LE PROBLEME DES
LACUNES EN DROIT 305 (1968).
13 SIMPSON & Fox, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 143-144 (1959).
14 22 A.J.I.L. 867, 911 (1928); 2 U.N.R.I.A.A. 829.
15 8 RECUEIL DES DECISIONS DES TRIBUNAUX ARBITRAUX MIXTES 413.
16 (Great Britain v. Portugal 1869); LAFONTAINE, PASICRISIE INTERNATIONALE 81,
82-83 (1902).
17 (Great Britain v. Portugal 1872); LAFONTAINE, supra at 170,171.
International Lawyer, Vol. 3, No. 4
International Non-Liquet 773
reason of the exceptional circumstances of the case." It appears that
the King had examined the case and felt that he would have been
constrained to decide against the United States. He intimated this to
the United States, and the claim against Peru was abandoned.',
Though this case has been cited as an example of non-liquet, it might
more appropriately be characterized as a decision not to decide. In
the Upper Silesia (Minority Schools) case, the dissenting judge,
Huber, found that the available rules did not support or govern the
claims in question and indicated the need for a non-liquet judg-
ment.19 He was alone in this view.
Until recently, it was generally believed that the problem of
non-liquet was of academic interest alone. The recent Sabbatino
case20 before the United States Supreme Court and the second phase
of the South West Africa cases21 demonstrate that the problem was
quiescent but has by no means disappeared. In Sabbatino, the
Supreme Court refused to decide a case on the merits because of,
inter alia, the absence of a uniformly accepted rule of law applicable
to the question at issue.22 It is amusing to note that had a French
court rendered the same opinion, its members would have been
subject to prosecution for a denial of justice. In the second phase of
the South West Africa cases, the International Court felt itself unable
to decide a question due to the absence of an "objective rule." The
Court argued that to undertake decision in this area would necessarily
have required it to make subjective choices, which, it felt, exceeded
its judicial mandate of applying rather than making law. Each of these
cases raises serious non-liquet issues.
If the problem of non-liquet can be formulated only in terms of a
conception of law as a body of rules created and sustained by a
sovereign power, the fact remains that non-liquet is not a problem
created by this theoretical formulation. In functional jurisprudential
systems and decision-oriented jurisprudences, the essential problem
of non-liquet, under a different rubric, does arise. Consider the not
infrequent circumstance in which there are no uniform expectations
shared by the litigants concerning the allocation of the disputed
18 2 MOORE, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATIONS 1611; RALSTON, INTERNATIONAL ARBI-
TRATION FROM ATHENS TO LOCARNO 216 (1929).
19 Series A. No. 15 at 54.
20 Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 US 398.
21 [1966] I.C.J. Reports 6.
22 376 U.S. at 405.
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matter or class of matters. In a situation such as this, the decision-
maker draws upon overriding community policies in order to derive a
solution. There is no question of who may or may not supplement, the
core of the classical non-liquet doctrine, and the general reference to
non-liquet in municipal discussions. This rather simple example
exposes the fact that the problem underpinning the doctrine of
non-liquet is often the key stimulus for litigation. Neither a statute
nor a contractual agreement can prevision every detail of planned
collaborative or imposed activity. The moment of agreement or
legislative fiat may express a high degree of consensus, but this spirit
of agreement may not continue thereafter to relatively bona fide
contention over an unforeseen aspect of a continuing regime. It is, in
short, precisely because of a "gap" that parties often turn to a
process of organized decision.
A decision-oriented jurisprudence accepts, as normal feature of
decision structures, the contingent prescriptive competence of judi-
cial and quasi-judicial personnel in situations of imprecise, inappli-
cable or obsolete legislative directives. The critical question is less
one of the location of prescriptive authority than of appropriate
operational procedures: how much should the judge prescribe in the
particular case? Despite ideological rancor, disciples of different
jurisprudential schools would tend to converge in viewing the prob-
lem of non-liquet as an operational rather than as a politically
theoretical problem.
Can the rather pragmatic national approach to non-liquet be
applied in international adjudication and arbitration? Professor Stone
has argued that there are serious doubts as to the automatic accep-
tance of municipal treatment of non-liquet in international law. 23 A
fundamental difference between national and international arenas is
the degree of stable correlation between authority and political
control in each. While in the municipal arena there is a high
probability of acceptance of a supplementing decision, this prob-
ability is a variable factor in the international arena. Even if one
decision is accepted, anticipation of supplementation may retard
subsequent resort to the largely consensual institution of interna-
tional arbitration. The questions of whether to supplement and how
much to supplement affect, then, both the acceptability and effective-
23 STONE, supra n.l at 154-156.
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ness of the instant decision as well as the future viability of
international arbitration.
In this respect, international non-liquet cannot be dismissed as a
metaphysical conundrum with no practical legal consequences.
Whether courts and arbitral tribunals "make law" is scarcely worthy
of discussion. No one will seriously contend, at the present time, that
Blackstone's classical view is an accurate descriptive or prescriptive
statement. Courts can, do and often should "make law." On certain
occasions, however, they refuse to perform the prescribing function.
They do not, as tribunals in the past might have done, expressly
invoke the doctrine of non-liquet. Yet these are non-liquet decisions.
The question of non-liquet can, then, be attacked more profitably
in a different formulation: under what conditions and with what
objectives do and should tribunals refrain from prescribing? If it is
conceded that tribunals do have the contingent competence to make
"judicial law," when and why have they refrained from doing so?24
II.
A reluctance to prescribe can spring from institutional character-
istics or from special contextual features. Perceived institutional
limitations of adjudication and arbitration might operate to deter a
court or tribunal from delivering a judgment in a particular type of
case. There are expectations regarding each of the phases of the
judicial process which authorize certain practices but prohibit others.
Furthermore, these expectations, held with varying degrees of inten-
sity, are affected by context and will vary with the circumstances.
Hence certain contextual features, such as a high crisis level or the
unavailability of a more appropriate process, might modify or over-
ride them. This understanding of non-liquet would mean that a
tribunal might refrain from decision not because of a gap in the rules
(a contention which rejects the creative and supplemental function of
judicial decision) but rather because of expected and demanded
limitations of their decision process.
Institutional limitations should not be pressed too far. An
historical perspective of no more than two or three hundred years is
24 Cf. Friedmann; The Limits of Judicial Lawmaking and Prospective Overruling, 29
M.L.R. 593 (1966).
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sufficient to demonstrate that there are few inherent characteristics of
adjudication. The enormous changes from a court of the 18th
century, procedurally and materially, to a court of the 20th century
show that the institutional characteristics of adjudication are a
function of the total social milieu. The more rapidly and radically the
milieu changes, the more rapidly and radically the institutional
characteristics of adjudication will modulate. Given the enormous
multi-value revolutions of our era, adjudication will probably change
drastically in the next century. This is not to say that at any given
moment there are no institutional limitations, that judges, lawyers
and observers do not operate with certain expectations about what a
tribunal may and may not do. But contentions of "inherent limita-
tions" or "essential nature" should be subjected to skeptical ex-
amination. Too often such arguments are the product of temporal
parochialism if not an irrational desire to mortgage the distant future.
The existence of certain perceived institutional limitations might
operate to deter a tribunal from supplementing in a certain case, or
even of rejecting jurisdiction entirely. But the clarity and compul-
siveness of such limitations requires careful examination. Before
considering refusals to prescribe, it will be useful to survey a number
of the more prominent institutional limitations and the responses
which they have engendered in particular cases. It will be seen that
responses have been governed as much by specific contextual
features as by putative institutional limitations.
1. Litigant Consent
International tribunals have generally held that they would not
act unless there was consent to jurisdiction or an appearance in Court
and not infrequently both have been required. 25 The demand for a
verbal and behavioral showing of consent to international judicial and
arbitral decision is a unique institutional feature. International parlia-
mentary arenas, in contrast, have not always deemed themselves so
bound as a matter of law. The differences in approach are well
illustrated in the Eastern Carelia case. 26 There, the Permanent Court
25 See, for example, Mavromattis Concessions Cases, Series A, No. 2 at 60; Status of
Eastern Carelia, Series B, No. 5 at 27-28; Corfu Channel case (Preliminary Objections) [1948]
I.C.J. Reports 15. For an extensive discussion of the doctrine of forum prorogatum before the
International Court of Justice, see I ROSENNE, THE LAW AND PROCEDURE OF THE INTERNA-
TIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 319 ff. (1965).
26 Series B, No. 5 at 7.
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held that it was beyond the judicial function to undertake decision
directly affecting a state which was neither a member of the League
and hence privy to the general injunction of peaceful resolution of
international disputes,2 7 nor willing to make a special submission to
the Court. The League Council and Assembly indicated their disagree-
ment with this decision and reasserted their competence in such
matters. 28 But in the last phase of the Corfu Channel case, 29 the
International Court construed a jurisdiction originally tenuously
acquired by forum prorogatum,30 to extend to the awarding of
damages, despite the objection and withdrawal of the losing party.
Albania has refused to comply with the Corfu Channel judgment. In
later cases in which a denial of prior consent seemed likely to take the
form of repudiation, the Court generally found grounds for relieving
itself of the necessity of decision. 31
At the highest level of generality, international adjudication pays
lip-service to the consensual nature of its jurisdiction. Yet consent is
a communication susceptible to varying degrees; its construction in a
contested case may require finding consent despite the contrary
statements of the "consenting party. ' ' 32 Thus, the consent argument,
even in modest form, contains a certain fictitious element. Municipal
ex-parte and in-absentia proceedings, as well as decisions undertaken
in cases affecting third parties, are common enough to suggest that
any inherent limitations of adjudication do not extend to the consent
and appearance of litigating parties. The aggregate behavior of the
Permanent Court and the International Court-the tribunals which
have been faced most squarely with the problem of consent to
jurisdiction-seems to be more appropriately explained as decision
27 See Articles 12 and 13 of the Covenant of the League of Nations.
28 1922 LNOJ, 1337, 1502.
29 [1949] I.C.J. Reports 244.
30 [1948] I.C.J. Reports 15.
31 See, for example, The Anglo-Iranian Oil Company case (Preliminary Objections)
[1952] I.C.J. Reports 93; Case Concerning the Aerial Incident of 27 July 1955 (Preliminary
Objections) [1959] I.C.J. Reports 127.
32 Consent, as a formal sign, is communicated at one point in time, with an implicit
context in the mind of the communicator, and applied to a relatively new factual situation at a
later point in time. Hence there is no artfulness in saying that an international tribunal is always
faced with the problem of determining whether a past expression of consent still conveys
consent. The MONETARY GOLD case is the most obvious example of this phenomenon. In that
case, Italy submitted a special consent to jurisdiction and on the following day introduced a
preliminary objection to jurisdiction. The International Court ultimately accepted the Italian
contention and denied itself jurisdiction to decide the case to which Italy had submitted itself:
[1954] I.C.J. Reports 19.
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by reference to the specific power and authority it could muster for
that case, rather than to the real scope and magnitude-if at all
verifiable-of the consent of the litigants.
33
It would be technically incorrect to contend that the demon-
strable absence of consent calls for a non-liquet response. The total
absence of consent, as in Eastern Carelia, is, indeed, perceived as an
institutional limitation, which will inhibit the tribunal from seising the
case. Where there is some communication upon which to peg a
consent construction, however, the institutional inclination may be
neutralized by a variety of other factors.
2. Litigant Objectives
The Permanent Court refused to be bound by constructions put
forward by the parties. As a multipartite international organ whose
decisions have prescriptive if not applicative effects on all parties to
the Statute, this position is sound.3 4 Yet its application has varied.
Thus, in the interpretation phase of the Chorzow Factory case, 35 the
Court simply recorded its unwillingness to be bound by interpreta-
tions put forward by the parties and proceeded to interpret as it saw
fit. The International Court acted in a parallel manner in Haya de la
Torre.3 6 But in the Free Zones case, the Permanent Court stated that
... the Court cannot as a general rule be compelled to choose between
constructions (of a treaty) determined beforehand none of which may corre-
spond to the opinion at which it may arrive.
37
On this ground, the Court refrained from delivering a decision.
Similar chiastic precedents can be found in international arbitra-
tion. 38
3. Enforceability
In the Northern Cameroons case, 39 an elusive institutional limit
was put forward for the first time by the International Court. The
33 For a sensitive examination of this nexus, see SCHECHTER, INTERPRETATION OF
AMBIGUOUS DOCUMENTS BY INTERNATIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNALS 130 (1964); see
also, LAUTERPACHT, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW BY THE INTERNATIONAL
COURT 91, 243 (1958).
34 For a detailed consideration, see Reisman, Revision of the South West Africa Cases, 7
VIRGINIA J. INT'L L. 1, 33, 34 (1966).
35 Series A, No. 13 at 4, 15-16.
36 [1950] I.C.J. Reports 395.
37 Series A, No. 22 at 15.
38 Chamizal, 11 U.N.R.I.A.A. 376; Island of Palmas, 2 U.N.R.I.A.A. 829.
39 [1963] I.C.J. Reports 15.
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Court seemed to be saying that a necessary element of justiciability
was that the cause be susceptible to compliance or execution.
"Normally" said the majority, "when the Court pronounces a judicial
condemnation there is room for the application of Article 94 of the
Charter:"
... there is a difference between the Court's considering the manner of
compliance with its judgment, or the likelihood of compliance, and, on the
other hand, considering whether the judgment, if rendered, would be suscep-
tible of any compliance or execution whatever at any time in the future.
40
Certainly, the Court did not mean that declaratory judgments or
mediant rather than terminal judgments concerning a phase of a
particular dispute were beyond its institutional capacity. As a matter
of policy, a declaratory power, a technique of preventive application
is obviously crucial in a rapidly changing context.41 In that particular
case, the Court implied that no matter what decision it might render,
there was absolutely nothing which could be done to ameliorate the
situation. In effect, the Court ruled that nothing should be done. It is
difficult to believe that it was operating on the basis of a perceived
institutional limitation or enunciating a precedent for the future.42
4. Litigant Equality
In theory, litigants in the adjudicative arena meet as equals. In
practice, there may be great inequalities in the aggregate values at the
disposal of the litigants. A tribunal genuinely concerned with main-
taining the equality of litigant parties has a number of devices open to
it for narrowing power disparities, 43 but they have rarely been
resorted to. International tribunals have generally construed equality
in terms of procedural rights and nothing more.
In Pelletier,44 the umpire felt incapable of acceding to Haiti's
40 Id. at 34.
41 "That the Court may, in an appropriate case, make a declaratory judgment is
indisputable." Id. at 37. See, generally, LAUTERPACHT, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW BY THE INTERNATIONAL COURT 250-252 (1958).
42 But consider Judge Waterman's opinion in the second phase of the Sabbatino case:
"We need not at present go into the question whether the granting of this type of remedy is a
feature of international law or of domestic law. But we do suggest that the failure of an
international tribunal to give a remedy of this type results from the inability of that kind of court
to enforce its awards and is not a result of the dictates of substantive international law
principles." Banco Nacional De Cuba v. Sabbatino, 307 F.2d 845, 868 (1962).
43 For example, examinations in loco or descentes sur les lieux, rogatory commissions,
change of siege and so on.
44 2 MOORE 1757.
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request for interrogatory commissions to be sent to Port au Prince,
assuming that such an act would have been in excess of jurisdiction.
Partly as a result, Haiti was unable to establish its case, the arbitrator
ruled incorrectly and the award had to be nullified. In the ILO case4 5
the International Court came close to exercising its discretion under
Article 65 of the Statute, not to render an advisory opinion, since the
relevant constituent documents put one of the parties at a serious
disadvantage. In this case, the Statute of the Administrative Tribunal
of the International Labor Organization allowed an appeal of sorts
from the Tribunal's decisions to the International Court. However,
the right of appeal, through the modality of a request for an advisory
opinion, was permitted only to the Executive Board of UNESCO; an
employee of UNESCO, the other party to the original case before the
Administrative Tribunal, had no right of appeal. Moreover, since
Article 34 of the Statute of the Court accords no locus standi to
individuals, only UNESCO could have appeared in oral hearings
before the Court. There were, as a result, serious procedural inequal-
ities between the parties to the case.
The Court did, in fact, decide the case. While emphasizing the
crucial character of equality in judicial proceedings, primary stress
was put on the features of the case. Since the employees had
succeeded in the first instance before the Administrative Tribunal,
said the Court, they would not have exercised an appeal right even if
they had had it; hence, the Court continued, no inequality was to be
found in the case at bar, in the exclusive appeal privilege of the
Executive Board of UNESCO. As regards the employees' lack of
locus standi for oral pleadings, the Court felt that this was equalized
by UNESCO limiting itself to written submissions and communi-
cating in this form the comments of the respondents. 46
The Court's reasoning is not thoroughly persuasive. The fact that
the winning party might not have appealed in no sense equalizes the
parties; the availability and exercise of an appeal privilege deprives
one party of a post-decisional recourse, while it indulges the other
party in this option. The presence or absence of an appeal option can
influence litigants in the formulation of first-instance objectives and
the choice of litigative strategies. Appearance before the administra-
45 [1956] I.C.J. Reports 77.
46 On the disposition of oral pleadings in international adjudication. See, in particular,
The Canada, 2 MOORE 1733, 1742; Eastern Carelia B/5 at 28; Corfu Channel (Compensation)
[1949] I.C.J. Reports 244, 248.
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tive tribunal was "final" for employees, but only the first step for the
Board. Finally, abandoning oral pleadings by both parties may have
equalized the parties, but it deprived the Court of a normal channel of
judicial intelligence.
The Court held that "any seeming or nominal absence of equality
ought not to be allowed to obscure or to defeat that primary
object."' 47 The majority evidently felt that the actual absences in the
case before it were nominal and would not have had a material effect.
The attitude of the Court in the ILO case, in short, indicates a
flexibility in regard to the doctrine of equality.
5. Material Finality
Judicial statements regarding material finality indicate a concern
with two institutional features. The first is the necessary finality of a
decision. The second is the political aspects of a decision. An
examination of the dicta themselves, and the cases and contexts in
which they were delivered, leaves the student with the hardly
exceptional feeling that express verbal statements often conceal
rather than reveal the actual motivations of tribunals. In the Free
Zones case, for example, the Permanent Court stated that
... it would be imcompatible with the Statute, and with its position as a Court of
of Justice, to give a judgment which would be dependent for its validity on the
subsequent approval of the parties. 48
On the other hand, the International Court stated as a fundamental
matter, in the Northern Cameroons case, that the Court was not
concerned with the post-judicial exploitation of its decision. 49 Yet it
is difficult to escape the conclusion that it was precisely this consid-
eration which led the Court to render a non-decision. In the ILO case,
the Court stated that it was of no moment to it that, by private
arrangement, the parties had undertaken to accept an advisory
opinion as a binding decision. 50 Yet the Court indicated in other
places that this consideration was, indeed, a matter of significance to
it.51 Moreover, in Eastern Carelia, the Permanent Court refused to
render an Advisory Opinion which it felt was in fact contentious. 52
41 [1956] I.C.J. Reports 77, 86.
48 Series AB, No. 46 at 96, 138.
41 [1963] I.C.J. Reports 15.
50 [1956] I.C.J. Reports 77, 84.
51 See, e.g., id. at 99.
52 Series B, No. 5 at 7.
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The irony of the judicial demand for an a priori assurance of
finality rather than conditional validity, is the necessarily conditional
quality of any judgment between sovereign states. It was perfectly
lawful under classical doctrines for the litigants to agree, after
judgment, either to disregard the decision or to resubmit it to another
tribunal as a new question. 53 As a matter of naked power, one state
may be capable of rendering a purportedly binding decision into one-
conditional in respect to a number of factors. The Court's concern
with the finality of its decisions appears to be anxiety for a number of
shifting contextual features. They may be generalized as concerns for
the effectiveness of its judgment, understood in a broad sense. It
refers neither to the complete value realization of a judicial statement
nor to its total rejection. Effectiveness is, in its most basic sense, a
high degree of conformity to the specific objectives as well as to the
more general goals of the tribunal. A projected unenforceable
decision would hence not necessarily be an ineffective one. The dicta
in the Northern Cameroons case can only be understood in this sense.
Despite the fact that the Court characterized the requested declara-
tory judgment as a brutum fulmen, the Court appears to have been
aware of the probable effects of the decision it was petitioned to
render. A declaratory judgment would indeed have been effective in
the conventional sense of the term. In a more comprehensive sense, it
would have been highly ineffective, since it appeared likely to disrupt
a local border r6gime with no probable gains for long-range world
order.
6. Political Questions
The concern with "political questions" is related to the problem
of finality and is part of the more general interest in effectiveness. A
political question is understood here as one for which a tribunal has a
formally adequate jurisdiction, but which it refuses to decide on the
ground that another process is a more appropriate arena of de-
cision. 54 When the other process is the legislative branch or its
53 See the Acosta claim. 3 MOORE 2187. It is probable that a judgment, though initiated
by private litigants, but dealing with a matter of inclusive concern (VIII/38 supra) could not be
vacated solely by bilateral agreement.
54 It is useful to distinguish the declaration of an "inappropriate" type of forum for a
particular case of class of cases, for example, courts or legislatures or administrative agencies,
from the declaration of an "inconvenient" forum. A holding by a court of forum non'conveniens
does not mean that the matter at bar is inappropriate for all courts, but only that it is, most
commonly for geographical reasons, inappropriate for that particular court.
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functional equivalent, the invocation by a court or tribunal of the
doctrine- of political question is essentially a finding of non-liquet. The
implication is that though the tribunal is generally competent to
prescribe interstitially, it refuses to do so in the case before it. A
finding of political question, then, presents, in refined form, the
perceived institutional limits of adjudicative prescription.
Despite a voluminous doctrinal literature on the problem of
political questions, there are relatively few international precedents
for this type of decision. In the South West Africa case, 55 cited earlier
in this regard, the majority spoke of a legal situation which might be
unsatisfactory but which, nevertheless, could not be remedied by a
court conscious of the limitations of the judicial process. Explicit
reference was made to the international legislator.5 6 In this case, the
problem was to construe a constitutive agreement made in an era in
which the structural features of international relations as well as the
general goal values of the international community were quite
different from those prevailing at the time of judgment.
Taken out of context, this appears to be a simple operation of
treaty interpretation. That such an operation might have "political"
repercussions has long been recognized by the International Court
but never deemed, of itself, to be a bar to adjudication. In the
Expenses case, for example, the Court noted that any construction of
the Charter would perforce have political consequences, but this, in
itself, was not enough to prevent the Court from seising the case. 57
The Court went further in the IMCO case, stating that if a question
were legal, but had some political aspects, the "requirements of its
judicial character" demanded, nevertheless, that the Court decide the
case.
58
Seen in context, South West Africa was an exceptional case of
treaty interpretation. The matter at bar was one of purported
constitutive prescription reshaping the world-power process. In
certain other cases in which this had been presented, there were
probabilities of effective decision. In South West Africa, in contrast,
the Court may have felt that any decision would be ineffective.
Hence, it avoided the case in part by finding of non-liquet.
55 [1966] I.C.J. Reports 7.
56 Id. at 36.
1, [1962] I.C.J. Reports 151, 155-156.
58 [1960] I.C.J. Reports 150, 153.
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7. Technical Problems
It has been held that matters of technical detail are beyond the
institutional capacity of adjudication. In the Free Zones case, the
Permanent Court stated that "the interplay of economic interests"
posed questions
... outside the sphere in which a Court of Justice, conerned with the
application of rules of law, can help in the solution of disputes between two
states. 5
9
In Haya de la Torre the Court refused to indicate how its prior
judgment ought to be enforced-the major point at issue-because, it
said, methods of execution turned on factors of political and admini-
strative detail with which only the parties were familiar. 60 Thus, on
two occasions, the Court manifested unwillingness to enter into
details of the power-and-wealth process, seeking to distinguish
between them and legal problems about them. Yet, in the Fisheries
case, the Court encountered problems of wealth and well-being, but
did not hold that these details were beyond its institutional capacity. 61
On the other hand, a subdued strain in the complex decision in the
second phase of the South West Africa cases played on the neces-
sarily subjective choices involved in decisions concerning the well-
being of individuals. 62 In the Infants case, the Court managed to skirt
the problem of the well-being of the minor in question, which was
certainly fundamental to the case. 63
III.
These cases seem to indicate a certain perceived institutional
limitation of the international judicial process; it appears that a
number of judges feel capable of drawing a fine line between "legal"
questions and "value" questions. This is assuredly not an inherent
limitation of adjudication; municipal courts in a number of polities
are daily engaged in deciding such matters. Furthermore, the Statute,
in providing for assessors, 64 clearly envisaged cases in which detailed
59 Series AB, No. 46 at 162.
60 [1951] I.C.J. Reports 78-79.
61 [1951] I.C.J. Reports 116.
62 [1966] I.C.J. Reports 7.
63 [1958] I.C.J. Reports 55.
64 Statute Article 30 (2); Article 7 of the Rules of Court.
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technical knowledge would be necessary for national decision.
Viewed in context, it would appear that these cases were motivated
by a variety of features of which the alleged institutional limitation
was of minimal significance. In the Fisheries case, the Court dealt
with complex economic questions which did not, however, touch on
major constitutional problems. In the Anglo-Iranian Oil Co.65 case, in
contrast, the Court would have been required to reorganize a legacy
of the discredited, yet still operative colonial period of world history;
this was a matter of major constitutional importance and would have
had far-reaching effects throughout the globe. A disinclination to
become involved in such a matter may have been a factor in the
Court's thoroughly unpersuasive judgment disseising jurisdiction.
The United States Supreme Court's 1965 decision in the controver-
sial Sabbatino case 66 is comprehensible in these terms. The sugges-
tion that the Supreme Court was incapable of dealing with an
expropriation case is absurd in the light of that tribunal's rich history
of eminent-domain decisions. It was not the complexities of the
wealth problem in these cases, but rather the enormous political
ramifications which probably motivated these courts to refuse deci-
sion.
The Court's reticence in regard to controversies over well-being
is not explicable in these terms. A municipal court presented with a
conflicts case dealing with an infant or with a prodigal, would
unhesitatingly direct itself to the essential question of the ward's
welfare and would apply the minimum standards of its own public
policy to the putative foreign arrangement. This divergence from the
principles of comity is justified by the community's concern for
individuals who are, as yet, deemed unable to exercise the plenum of
civil choices in a manner comporting with their own interests. The
parallel with the Infants case 67 applied equally to the international
supervision of mandates and trusteeships.
In the light of general and accepted municipal judicial practice,
and the relatively amiable milieu of the Infants case, the reluctance of
the Court to pierce to the heart of the problem is perplexing. In view
of the comparatively large majority, the express judgment may have
represented a compounded compromise of decision from which the
65 [1952] I.C.J. Reports 93.
66 376 U.S. 398.
67 [1958] I.C.J. Reports 55.
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more controversial motives were removed. Whatever the cause, it is
to be hoped that this phenomenon was an exceptional occurrence not
to be repeated. The judgment in the second phase of the South West
Africa case was probably motivated by the control problem facing
any positive decision.
If there is an institutional limitation regarding cases of intricate
technical detail, it should operate on the principle of economy rather
than on the principle of difficulty. It is startling to imagine a tribunal
shirking a case because it is too difficult. On the other hand, cogentive
tribunals operating under a rather inflexible statutory r6gime may
perceive that certain matters would impose a heavy burden upon it
and that other processes, better tooled for the instant matter, are
available. In a situation such as this, it is a simple matter of economy
to direct the litigants to the alternate process. In the absence of an
alternate, a refusal to seise the matter on the grounds of difficulty is
an act of injustice.
One point to be drawn from these cases is that in an evolving
decision process perceived institutional limitations, no matter what
the degree of intensity with which they are held, are essentially
derivations of past practice. A decision to apply the limitations to
future decision, though possibly presented in the form of institutional
constraint should be viewed as a matter of choice, conditioned by
perspectives and environmental features one of which will be the
problem of political control. Accurate analysis of past decisions and
appraisal of alternate options must go beyond tests of simple
conformity to the past and consider current and future world
community needs as well. Non-liquet examined as an aspect of
perceived limitations of the judicial process in its prescriptive and
applicative functions, is no exception. The available decisions indi-
cate that past practice, as the expression of institutional limitations,
has been only one, not always decisive, factor in express and implicit
non-liquet decisions.
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